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REACHING THE INDIVIDUAL: A PROPOSED FEDERAL 
FRAMEWORK TO REDUCE COMMUNITY-BASED 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
Rachel Manning* 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal regimes that aim to reduce greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emissions have largely focused on major polluters and energy 
generators. Market incentives, such as cap and trade programs, and 
command and control regulatory efforts generally target large industry 
players. However, this approach ignores the power of shifting behavior 
at the grassroots level and fails to engage the general public in adopting 
sustainable practices. The cumulative effect of individual and 
organizational emissions reductions on a national scale would be 
significant. A cultural shift of this nature requires more than education 
and awareness initiatives. Similar to corporations, individuals respond 
to financial incentives. Such programs have already been 
implemented, but there is no coordinated regime in place to encourage 
individual behavior change at the federal or state level. 
Federal legislation that encourages states to adopt incentives tailored 
to geographic and demographic needs could fill this gap. By drawing 
on principles of cooperative federalism, as in the Clean Air Act, 
nationwide goals may be achieved through plans devised at the state 
level. States and local governments are best suited to craft effective 
programming for their residents. Policies that work well in urban areas 
may be ineffective in rural communities, and vice versa. The strength 
of the cooperative federalism approach lies in giving states the 
flexibility to design and administer programs catered to the needs of 
local populations, as compared with a one-size-fits-all approach. 
This Note will explore existing and potential incentives for 
grassroots behavior changes and propose a framework to incorporate 
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them into a federal regulatory regime using the Clean Air Act as a 
model. The ideas in this Note will build upon existing literature 
regarding how the government should address the role of individuals 
and households in controlling national GHG emissions. 
Section I of this Note describes the need for increased engagement 
of individuals in national climate change efforts and the shortcomings 
of legislation that focuses exclusively on major polluters. It then 
explores incentive programs that have been implemented in the United 
States and Europe, as well as suggestions for novel incentives. Two 
types of programs will be discussed: those that reach individuals 
directly, and those that operate via a conduit, such as an employer. This 
section will also make recommendations based on lessons learned 
from existing grassroots incentive programs, including the role of 
geography and demography in crafting effective policies. 
Section II of this Note outlines a legislative approach based on the 
Clean Air Act in which the federal government encourages states to 
adopt policies that in turn incentivize individuals to reduce their GHG 
emissions. This discussion will incorporate the incentives outlined in 
Section I to describe how such legislation could be implemented at the 
federal and state levels. Thus, Section I lays the foundation for how 
grassroots incentives could operate, and Section II ties those programs 
into a holistic federal scheme with an overarching incentive structure. 
Section III of this Note discusses policy implications of the proposed 
legal framework, compliance concerns, potential legal challenges and 
how those challenges may be addressed. The Note concludes by 
emphasizing the promise of cooperative federalism as a tool to engage 
individuals across the country in reducing our collective carbon 
footprint. 
SECTION I: MULTI-SECTOR EFFORTS TO CURB INDIVIDUALS’ 
EMISSIONS 
A. The Overlooked Individual 
Individual behaviors comprise a large portion of United States 
pollution and GHG emissions.1 The cumulative effect of daily 
                                                                 
 1. John C. Dernbach, Harnessing Individual Behavior to Address Climate 
Change, 26 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 107 (2008); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Individual 
as Polluter, 35 ENVTL. L. REP.  10723, 10723–24 (2005). 
2018] REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 125 
 
activities, such as driving a car, disposing of garbage, and using 
electronics, is significant. According to some estimates, carbon 
dioxide emissions from individuals and households make up one third 
or more of national GHG emissions.2 Yet individuals have been largely 
excluded from domestic and international efforts to abate climate 
change. Indeed, no environmental statute or regulation recognizes 
individuals as a source category of pollution or emissions.3 National 
environmental laws, such as the Clean Air Act, have targeted industrial 
polluters, such as power plants and factories, as the largest sources of 
GHG emissions. Market-based incentives, such as cap and trade 
programs, focus on major emitters as well. This approach ignores the 
role individuals can play in reducing national GHG emissions and 
renders their participation optional. Rather than focusing solely on 
major polluters, federal and local policies should encourage 
individuals to contribute to climate change efforts. This Note proposes 
a holistic regulatory framework that incorporates grassroots 
participation in reducing national GHG emissions. Scholars have 
advocated for increased attention to the role of individual GHG 
emissions, and this Note will contribute to this ongoing discussion by 
proposing a regulatory solution. In addition to reducing GHG 
emissions from individuals, this approach may reduce apathy towards 
climate change and engage the public in important conversations about 
the future of our planet. 
B.    Proposed Incentives 
This section will describe and analyze the strengths and weaknesses 
of incentives implemented in the United States and abroad. It will also 
propose new incentives based on existing models and programs. The 
incentives discussed target renewable energy, waste diversion, and 
alternative transportation. According to research from the International 
Panel on Climate Change, the transportation, buildings, electricity and 
heat production, and other energy sectors combined comprise fifty-
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five percent of global GHG emissions.4 In addition, the United Nations 
reported in 2013 that food waste ranks as the third largest GHG emitter 
after the United States and China.5 Food waste discarded in landfills 
produces methane,6 a GHG that traps radiation in the atmosphere at 
least twenty-five times more efficiently than carbon dioxide over a 100 
year period.7 Thus, these sectors should be prioritized when crafting 
incentive programs. Subsections 1 and 2 will focus on financial 
incentives that reach individuals directly. Subsection 3 will discuss 
indirect incentives that use the workplace as a conduit. 
1. Energy Conservation 
There are some United States government incentives in place to 
reward certain individual behaviors, but these efforts are scattered and 
disconnected from each other. Financial incentives to promote clean 
energy include tax deductions for producing renewable energy and 
installing energy-efficient appliances. Variations of such policies can 
be found across the country, along with state grant programs that 
promote energy-efficient technology and green building design.8 
Depending on one’s state, an individual may be eligible for a tax credit 
or rebate if they install renewable energy systems or energy-efficient 
appliances in their home.9 The Internal Revenue Service also offers tax 
                                                                 
 4. Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
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 6. Id. at 20–22. 
 7. Overview of Greenhouse Gases, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/
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financing-what-options-are-available-you [https://perma.cc/7ZYC-ZASS]; N.J.’S 
CLEAN ENERGY PROGRAM, http://www.njcleanenergy.com/main/rebates-and-
promotions/rebates-and-promotions [https://perma.cc/GYF5-FQ9W] (last visited 
May 16, 2018). 
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credits for purchasers of electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid 
vehicles.10 
Similar to the United States, the European Union has also targeted 
household electric appliances as a means to increase energy-efficiency 
and reduce GHG emissions.11 Germany in particular has served as a 
model for incentivizing individual and household behavior change. 
German insurance companies offer reduced premiums to residential 
building owners who have made improvements to conserve energy.12 
The government offers low-interest loans to homeowners who 
modernize existing buildings, construct new energy-efficient 
buildings, or install solar generation systems.13 An ordinance requires 
owners of multi-occupancy residential buildings to bill tenants for heat 
and hot water costs according to their usage; tenants are entitled to 
claim fifteen percent of their energy consumption costs from their 
landlord if they fail to follow this procedure.14 This billing scheme 
effectively raises tenants’ awareness of their energy consumption and 
encourages them to conserve. Germany has also implemented an 
ecological fuel tax that has successfully reduced carbon dioxide 
emissions from the transportation sector.15 
Another way to reduce household energy consumption is to 
encourage residents to participate in renewable energy delivery 
systems, such as community solar projects and energy service 
companies (“ESCOs”). ESCOs generate renewable energy and sell the 
electricity to a utility for distribution to regional or national 
subscribers, while community solar projects may limit participation to 
local residents. Community solar projects make renewable energy 
accessible to residents in multi-occupancy buildings, making them 
ideal for urban communities or rural residences that lack adequate 
sunlight. Customers can pay to support a local solar project and receive 
                                                                 
 10. Electric Vehicles: Tax Credits and Other Incentives, DOE OFFICE OF ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/eere/electricvehicles/
electric-vehicles-tax-credits-and-other-incentives [https://perma.cc/3G62-D2BY] 
(last visited May 16, 2018). 
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 12. Id. at 18. 
 13. Id. at 23–25. 
 14. Id. at 21. 
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a credit on their electricity bill depending on the amount paid and 
energy generated.16 This model has flourished in Minnesota, due in 
part to favorable government policies. The state’s 2013 Solar Energy 
Legislation requires investor-owned utilities to source 1.5% of their 
electricity from solar by 2020, and at least 10% of this energy must be 
generated by facilities with a maximum capacity of 20 kilowatts.17 
Further, at least 20% of electricity sales must be generated by 
renewable energy sources by 2020, and at least 25% by 2025.18 Since 
that law passed, Minnesota’s solar market has grown nearly twenty 
times larger, increasing support for power generated by grassroots 
solar projects.19 Another factor in Minnesota’s solar success is that the 
state does not cap community solar output,20 and the state’s program 
reached a record 300 megawatts of operational capacity in March, 
2018.21 Electricity generated in excess of the needs of community solar 
participants may be sold to the grid.22 
In addition, residents of states with deregulated energy markets can 
subscribe to an ESCO that delivers energy from renewable sources. 
Thus, a subscriber in New York City may receive wind energy from 
Nebraska or solar energy from Arizona delivered via an ESCO. State 
governments could encourage residents to subscribe to a renewable 
energy ESCO or community solar project by providing a tax credit or 
rebate for each year of participation. The government could also 
subsidize renewable energy ESCOs to ensure that residents’ electricity 
bills won’t exceed the amount spent under a non-renewable energy 
provider, if there is a price difference. 
                                                                 
 16. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 386 (Michael B. Gerrard & Jody 
Freeman eds., 2d ed. 2014). 
 17. Bob Eleff, 2013 Solar Energy Legislation in Minnesota, MINN. HOUSE 
RESEARCH DEP’T (August 2013), http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/ss/
sssolarleg.pdf. 
 18. Id. 
 19. John Farrell, Minnesota has the best community solar program—here’s why, 
MINNPOST (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2017/
08/minnesota-has-best-community-solar-program-heres-why [https://perma.cc/
62LW-WLZR]. 
 20. Id. 
 21. John Farrell, Why Minnesota’s Community Solar Program is the Best, 
INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE (Apr. 23, 2018), https://ilsr.org/minnesotas-
community-solar-program [https://perma.cc/32D4-7BWL]. 
 22. Eleff, supra note 17. 
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One concern with this proposal is that local governments may not 
be willing to provide such incentives if the renewable energy is not 
generated in their own state. Because ESCOs source energy from 
across the country, participants are often contributing to national, not 
local, GHG emissions reduction. However, states would be rewarded 
for incentivizing their residents to enroll in ESCOs regardless of where 
the emissions are reduced. Nevertheless, states may have ideological 
objections to participating in renewable energy schemes; states in 
which fossil fuel production comprises a large sector of the local 
economy may resist renewable energy initiatives on principle. In 
addition, customers in some states have been the victims of 
unscrupulous ESCO practices.23 For example, in New York, a service 
company made false promises of lower prices to lure customers, 
enrolled people without their consent, and made it difficult for them to 
unsubscribe. Negative publicity about unscrupulous ESCOs could be 
a deterrent. State governments should monitor and vet ESCOs serving 
their residents to ensure that they do not put them at risk for 
exploitation. 
2. Waste Diversion 
Another category of government incentives aims to divert waste 
from landfills. Landfills are the third largest source of methane 
emissions in the United States,24 and methane is a more potent GHG 
than carbon dioxide.25 A primary component of methane in landfills is 
organic waste, which can be diverted through composting. Pay-as-you-
throw (“PAYT”) systems have been successful in some European 
countries and American municipalities in reducing the total amount of 
waste sent to landfill.26 Participating governments charge residents for 
                                                                 
 23. AG Schneiderman To Distribute More Than $1 Million In Restitution To Nys 
Energy Customers Promised Lower Rates, N.Y. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
(July 7, 2015), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-distribute-more-1-
million-restitution-nys-energy-customers-promised [https://perma.cc/YD59-44CR]. 
 24. U.S. Food Waste Challenge FAQ’s, USDA, https://www.usda.gov/oce/
foodwaste/faqs.htm [https://perma.cc/43FP-KRAX] (last visited May 16, 2018). 
 25. Understanding Global Warming Potentials, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
ghgemissions/understanding-global-warming-potentials [https://perma.cc/K6NQ-
84L4] (last visited May 16, 2018). 
 26. Pay-As-You-Throw/Save-Money-And-Reduce-Trash PAYT/SMART Fast 
Facts, MASSDEP (Nov. 2016), https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2016/11/oh/
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garbage collection services according to the amount of trash they 
produce, measured either by weight or number of garbage bags. This 
system prompts residents to recycle and compost to reduce their 
garbage collection fees. In 2015, a study of PAYT programs in 
Massachusetts revealed that municipalities that implemented such 
incentives produced only sixty-four percent of the landfill waste 
generated in non-participating municipalities.27 Likewise, all 
European countries with recycling rates over forty-five percent had 
implemented a PAYT or similar system, while most countries with 
recycling rates below twenty percent had not.28 The EU Landfill 
Directive of 1999 restricted the quantity of waste EU member 
countries could send to landfills, and the subsequent landfill tax further 
prompted countries to implement recycling and composting 
incentives.29 
In the United States, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA) delegates most non-hazardous waste management to the 
states within the bounds of minimum federal requirements,30 and many 
                                                                 
paytfast.pdf; Municipal waste management across European countries, EUROPEAN 
ENVTL. AGENCY (May 23, 2017), https://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/waste/
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 27. Pay-As-You-Throw/Save-Money-And-Reduce-Trash PAYT/SMART Fast 
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 28. Municipal waste management across European countries, EUROPEAN 
ENVTL. AGENCY (May 23, 2017), https://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/waste/
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 29. Adam Vaughan, What has the EU ever done for my . . . compost?, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 22, 2016, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/
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3WV3]; Waste, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/landfill
index.htm [https://perma.cc/SHL8-7PFV] (last visited May 16, 2018); LONDON 
ASSEMBLY, Carrots and Sticks: A review of waste financial reward and compulsory 
recycling schemes 14 (2011), https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/gla_
migrate_files_destination/Waste%20financial%20incentives%20FINAL2.pdf. 
 30. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Overview, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/rcra/resource-conservation-and-recovery-act-rcra-overview 
[https://perma.cc/NP6Y-F7BE] (last visited May 16, 2018); Robert V. Percival et al., 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 122 (Wolters Kluwer 
Law & Business 7th ed. 2013). 
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states promote or require recycling of various materials.31 More than 
half of the states have adopted e-waste recycling policies, at least ten 
have container redemption programs, and many have laws that impose 
a penalty for recycling solid waste improperly.32 In addition, a program 
called Recyclebank partners with municipalities and brands to reward 
individuals and households for recycling,33 among other sustainable 
behaviors. Individuals in participating municipalities receive points 
each time their recyclables are collected, and points are allocated based 
on the weight of the recyclables.34 Points can be redeemed for a variety 
of prizes. Recyclebank operates in at least twenty-nine states across 
the United States and began partnering with communities in the United 
Kingdom in 2009.35 In both the United States and United Kingdom, 
this incentive program has effectively shifted behaviors to induce 
higher rates of recycling.36 
There are some potential drawbacks to waste diversion incentive 
schemes. One concern is illegal diversion; residents may burn or dump 
trash illegally to reduce their garbage collection costs in a PAYT 
system.37 However, this has not been a significant problem in practice, 
and municipalities can deter such behavior by implementing strong 
enforcement policies.38 The Recyclebank model presents an 
opportunity for perverse incentives: residents may deliberately 
produce more waste in order to accumulate more points. According to 
a 2011 report by the London Assembly Environment Committee, 
Recyclebank has procedures in place to avoid this outcome.39 Finally, 
waste diversion models like PAYT and Recyclebank are more 
effectively applied to single-occupancy residences than large 
apartment buildings.40 These systems could face challenges in dense 
urban communities where multi-occupancy buildings comprise a large 
                                                                 
 31. Alexander et al., supra note 8, at 10–11. 
 32. Id. at 11–12. 
 33. RECYCLEBANK, https://www.recyclebank.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/
L6GB-2U7Z] (last visited May 16, 2018). 
 34. LONDON ASSEMBLY, supra note 29, at 17. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 18. 
 37. Illegal Diversion, EPA, https://archive.epa.gov/wastes/conserve/tools/payt/
web/html/top8.html [https://perma.cc/3Y3N-4PG3] (last visited May 16, 2017). 
 38. Id. 
 39. LONDON ASSEMBLY, supra note 29, at 25. 
 40. Id. at 27–29. 
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portion of the housing stock. In London, this approach failed due to 
high costs of implementation, logistical barriers, and low 
participation.41 
New York, San Francisco, Seattle, and Portland are among the 
American cities that have implemented curbside compost collection,42 
while others provide a rebate on home composting equipment.43 
However, unlike recycling, there are few incentive programs in place 
to reward individuals who compost. A save-as-you-throw (“SAYT”) 
model for composting could achieve this by giving individuals a 
financial incentive based on the weight of compost they put out for 
curbside collection—the reverse of charging residents per unit of 
landfill waste generated in a PAYT regime. In places where compost 
is collected at centralized drop-off stations, individuals could receive 
a financial incentive based on the amount of compost they deliver. For 
example, at New York City’s Greenmarket compost collection sites, 
individuals could receive a two-dollar voucher called a “Greenmarket 
Buck,” redeemable for products at any Greenmarket, in exchange for 
dropping off their compost.44 Vouchers could be allocated based on 
the weight of the compost delivered. Municipalities or states could 
invest in rewarding residents for composting if the cost of providing 
the financial incentives were outweighed by savings associated with 
reducing landfill waste. Municipalities seeking to use the stick rather 
than the carrot could penalize residents who don’t separate their food 
scraps from other waste, similar to the common method of enforcing 
recycling policies. 
                                                                 
 41. Id. at 28–29. 
 42. Evelyn Cheng, Are you gonna eat that? The future of recycling, CNBC (Dec. 
23, 2014), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/12/22/composting-may-be-future-of-
recycling-with-us-cities-leading-the-way.html [https://perma.cc/TTP4-RU47]. 
 43. Austin Resource Recovery, AUSTINTEXAS.GOV, http://www.austintexas.
gov/composting [https://perma.cc/GN8U-92Q9] (last visited May 16, 2018); 
Environmental Services, CITY OF SAN DIEGO, https://www.sandiego.gov/
environmental-services/recycling/residential/compostbinvoucher 
[https://perma.cc/HNP4-HD6K] (last visited May 16, 2018); Compost Bin Coupon 
for Ventura Residents!, CITY OF VENTURA (Oct. 5, 2011), http://sustainableventura.
tv/2011/10/05/compost-bin-coupon-for-ventura-residents/ [https://perma.cc/Z8HS-
39TT]. 
 44. Greenmarket Bucks, GROWNYC, https://www.grownyc.org/greenmarket/
bucks [https://perma.cc/FBQ5-MVLK] (last visited May 16, 2018). 
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3. Transportation 
Local governments can directly incentivize consumers to travel by 
bicycle or alternative fuel vehicle. For example, New York City has 
partnered with Citibank to provide fleets of bicycles throughout the 
city which can be rented by the hour and returned to any Citi Bike 
station.45 Offering attractive prices for bike share programs may 
encourage more residents to bike than to travel by car or even public 
transit. Municipalities can also reward owners of hybrid or low-
emission vehicles by providing free parking on public streets. Salt 
Lake City offers two hours of meter-free parking for vehicles that meet 
certain EPA fuel economy and air pollution standards.46 These 
transportation incentives are best-suited to urban environments; biking 
may not be a feasible mode of transit in rural areas, and metered 
parking is rare outside cities. 
4. Indirect Initiatives 
In addition to directly incentivizing behavior change, local 
governments can reward employers that implement programming to 
incentivize individuals to go green. This ‘meta-incentive’ rewards both 
the employer and the employees for sustainability both in and outside 
the workplace. 
Some employers have already implemented such incentives. For 
example, the League of American Bicyclists has recognized Target, 
Facebook, LinkedIn, and other companies for their robust alternative 
transportation programs.47 Resources available to employees include 
free onsite bike repairs, regular riding and maintenance classes, guided 
commute rides, and access to a corporate bicycle fleet.48 These 
incentives eliminate costs and concerns associated with biking, but 
employers could go further by rewarding employees who use 
alternative transportation. Organizations can offer health insurance 
premium discounts, cash, gift cards, or other financial incentives to 
                                                                 
 45. CITI BIKE, https://www.citibikenyc.com/how-it-works [https://perma.cc/
U266-5R29] (last visited May 16, 2018). 
 46. Gerrard & Freeman, supra note 16, at 383. 
 47. Liz Murphy, Business Innovators Invest in Bicycling, THE LEAGUE OF 
AMERICAN BICYCLISTS (Apr. 22, 2014), http://bikeleague.org/content/business-
innovators-invest-bicycling [https://perma.cc/KC8E-AMTT]. 
 48. Id. 
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employees who bike, walk, or take public transit to work. Some 
workplace wellness programs have used these tools to encourage 
healthier behaviors.49 Local governments could reward employers for 
adopting such incentives by giving them a tax credit or other financial 
incentive each year the program is in place. Currently, employers only 
receive recognition from volunteer or non-profit organizations when 
they invest in sustainability programs. Smaller organizations with 
fewer resources may not be able to offer such programs. A financial 
incentive could encourage more employers to participate and offset the 
costs of doing so. 
Similarly, government incentives could be used to reward employers 
for implementing recycling and composting programs. The cumulative 
impact of reducing waste from individual employees in an office 
building is significant. Many individuals consume more food and 
generate more waste at work than they do at home. Thus, incentivizing 
waste diversion from households alone is insufficient, and employers 
are uniquely positioned to shape sustainability policies that impact 
their entire workforce. Employers that participate in recycling or 
composting programs could submit proof of participation to receive a 
tax credit or other financial incentive from the government on an 
annual basis. Examples of such proof could include a receipt from a 
recycling/compost collection service or official company policy with 
records of employees who manage composting activities. 
SECTION II: ENCOURAGING STATE PARTICIPATION IN FEDERAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE EFFORTS 
A. Carrots and Sticks: Approaches to Shaping State Behavior 
Federal lawmakers and agencies must respect states’ sovereignty, 
not only as a constitutional matter, but because effective laws must 
take into account local differences in geography and demography. At 
the same time, local policies must be woven into an overarching 
framework in order to yield a measurable, nationwide impact. This is 
particularly true in the environmental context. The urgency of climate 
change demands a national response, but cities and states should have 
                                                                 
 49. Employer health incentives, HARVARD T.H. CHAN SCHOOL OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH (Winter 2009), https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/magazine/winter09
healthincentives/ [https://perma.cc/8QBC-8CQP]. 
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the freedom to adopt policies best suited to their unique populations. 
The Clean Air Act honored the importance of states’ independence in 
crafting their own methods to meet federal air pollution standards. In 
addition, South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), highlighted the 
tension between state sovereignty and legitimate federal interests in 
incentivizing local policymaking. This section will discuss approaches 
to cooperative federalism and its potential implications for proposed 
climate change legislation. 
In attempting to federalize environmental laws, Congress has used 
three general approaches.50 The first is to provide federal financial 
assistance to encourage states to adopt environmental standards. The 
effectiveness of this approach depends primarily on the size of the 
“carrot,” which in turn depends on the availability of federal funds. 
This method has been successful in areas where states resist federal 
regulation, such as land use and solid waste management. The second 
approach is cooperative federalism, in which federal agencies establish 
national environmental standards and states implement them locally.51 
While states may be delegated authority to administer local programs 
to meet federal requirements, they are not required to do so. The 
federal government enforces the national standards within states that 
choose not to administer their own programs. The Clean Air Act, Clean 
Water Act, RCRA, and the Safe Drinking Water Act are examples of 
the cooperative federalism model. The third approach favors federal 
control.52 Regulations such as the Toxic Substances Control Act rely 
on the principle of federal preemption to implement uniform national 
regulation without delegating any administrative authority to states. 
This paper will focus on the second approach in prompting states to 
adopt policies that reach individuals at the grassroots level. 
The Clean Air Act provides a useful model of cooperative 
federalism that can help integrate local and federal efforts to address 
climate change. The EPA sets standards to protect public health and 
the environment from adverse effects of air pollution.53 States then 
submit their own implementation plans to achieve these standards.54 If 
a state does not submit an approvable implementation plan, EPA can 
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require revisions and ultimately issue a federal implementation plan. 
In this way, states are given flexibility to design their own plans within 
the bounds of federal standards. 
In addition, the Supreme Court has held that monetary incentives are 
constitutional exercises of Congressional authority under the 
Commerce, Tax, and Spending Clauses. Such incentives are 
permissible if they are in the pursuit of the general welfare, are not 
coercive or ambiguous, and demonstrate a connection between the 
funds being conditioned and the federal interest in question.55 
B. Cooperative Federalism and Climate Change 
The Clean Air Act and Supreme Court precedent can guide national 
legislation to incentivize state action on climate change by promoting 
programs such as those discussed in Section I. The federal government 
could set a national goal for GHG emissions reduction programs, 
similar to the Clean Air Act’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS)56 for existing sources, and calculate a proportionate 
contribution for each state based on current emissions levels and 
population. Under the Clean Air Act, states devise regulations to meet 
the NAAQS through state implementation plans (“SIPs”).57 If states 
do not submit an approvable SIP, the EPA administers a federal 
implementation plan (FIP)58 to ensure the national standards are met. 
In 2009, the EPA issued an endangerment finding for GHGs, including 
carbon dioxide, following the Supreme Court’s ruling that the Clean 
Air Act definition of “air pollutant” was broad enough to encompass 
GHGs.59 This allowed the EPA to regulate carbon dioxide and other 
GHGs to protect public health and the environment. Thus, the concept 
of regulating GHG emissions is not new. 
Similar to the structure of the Clean Air Act, states could determine 
how to achieve compliance with the federal mandate. SIPs would rely 
                                                                 
 55. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987); New York v. United 
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on local programming that helps individuals reduce their GHG 
emissions in the workplace and at home, such as the incentives 
discussed in Section I. In the energy sector, states could promote the 
growth of community solar projects, incentivize individuals to use 
alternative energy at home, and reward those who retrofit their homes 
or install energy-efficient appliances. In the waste sector, they could 
introduce pay-as-you-throw garbage collection policies, mandate 
composting and recycling, introduce free curbside compost pickup, or 
offer incentives to those who compost voluntarily. In the transportation 
sector, they could reward employers that provide alternative 
transportation resources and incentives to employees, as well as 
individuals who purchase electric or hybrid vehicles. While some 
cities, towns, and states have already implemented such incentives, 
this has largely taken place on a voluntary basis, and there is no 
comprehensive incentive system to reward or punish local 
governments based on their participation. 
Following the example of the Clean Air Act, state implementation 
plans could be composed of a basket of incentives best suited to local 
characteristics. Best practices have demonstrated that PAYT systems 
of waste collection are more effective in places with single-occupancy 
homes than in large apartment complexes.60 On the other hand, the 
German ordinance that bills tenants directly for their energy use would 
be most applicable in multi-unit residential buildings. Rewards for 
biking or using public transit are more logical in urban rather than rural 
places. Residents of single-occupancy homes would be best situated to 
take advantage of tax incentives for retrofitting their homes with 
energy-efficient appliances. The Recyclebank program, like other 
waste management practices, should be adopted at the municipal level. 
Thus, a one-size-fits-all incentive policy would not account for 
differences between and within states. The federal government could 
set standards for the plans, such as a minimum number of incentives 
that must be implemented within specific sectors. States could work 
with local governments to ensure that they have implemented 
incentives in the energy, waste, and transportation sectors without 
telling them which specific programs to adopt. Local governments 
could submit reports on their emissions reduction activities to the state, 
which could compile them for submission to the federal government. 
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States could also choose to coordinate some programs through state 
agencies to ensure uniformity across all municipalities, such as 
workplace sustainability incentives. 
Some incentives are best implemented at the federal level. For 
example, it may be more efficient to coordinate tax incentives for 
electric or hybrid vehicles or energy-efficient appliances through the 
U.S. Department of Energy. This would ensure consistent nation-wide 
incentives and a streamlined submission process managed by a federal 
agency. However, states and municipalities should be encouraged to 
adopt additional incentives that further reduce emissions at the local 
level. 
 States that do not submit a plan for approval to the federal 
government or that do not attain compliance with the federal standards 
could be subject to reduced funding from the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, the Federal Highway Administration, the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, or the U.S. Department of Energy. This 
scheme would likely not violate the federal spending power. First, 
reducing GHG emissions in order to abate climate change serves a 
public purpose. Climate change threatens public health and the future 
of our planet, and is exacerbated by continued GHG emissions. Thus, 
reducing GHG emissions serves a public interest. Second, legislators 
would need to choose a percentage of federal funds that would not be 
unduly coercive if withheld from states, in order to allow them to 
“exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of 
their participation.”61 Third, there is a reasonable relationship between 
the nature of the federal funds being withheld and the public interest 
being served. Funds from federal agencies that deal with 
transportation, federal highways, agriculture, and energy are used by 
states to implement local programming related to those subjects. It is 
reasonable for federal agencies to withhold a portion of this funding to 
encourage states to align their climate change policies with federal 
priorities in pursuit of the general welfare. Under the Clean Air Act, 
states that do not remedy deficient state implementation plans within 
a certain period of time are subject to restricted federal highway funds 
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for projects in nonattainment areas.62 This can serve as a model for 
conditioning federal funds on state alignment with federal standards. 
SECTION III: ANTICIPATED BARRIERS TO SUCCESSFUL 
IMPLEMENTATION 
A. Challenges 
The first challenge is both political and ideological. Given the 
current administration and right-leaning Congress, it is unlikely any 
climate change legislation will be passed during the current term of 
office. Furthermore, American culture places a high value on 
individual freedom. A law that seeks to change individual behaviors 
would likely be very unpopular. Even though many Americans support 
policies that address climate change,63 they often resist laws that 
infringe their personal liberties. No major environmental laws have 
been passed in decades, and legislative action on climate change is 
politically fraught. If a climate change bill were proposed, it would be 
more likely to target emissions from companies, organizations, and 
local governments rather than individuals. 
The second challenge is administrative. Federal, state, and local 
agencies expend resources in responding to climate change, and these 
expenses will continue to increase if we do not drastically reduce our 
GHG emissions. However, a thorough cost-benefit analysis would be 
necessary for climate change legislation that could have significant 
costs as well. A law that requires coordination between federal, state, 
and local governments, as well as non-government entities and 
individuals, will entail monitoring, reporting, and other administrative 
costs. Adequate monitoring is necessary to ensure tax credits or other 
financial rewards are not distributed inappropriately. Ineffective 
monitoring and inaccurate reporting could lead to lost tax revenue 
without the intended environmental benefits. Administrative costs 
could be high, and it is not clear whether they would exceed the money 
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saved by reducing public health and environmental harms. This 
legislation would also require federal and state agencies to contribute 
resources to implementing incentives at the local level. For example, 
financial rewards used to promote municipal composting and the use 
of bikes or public transit must be funded or subsidized by the federal 
or state government to make participation feasible. The need for 
financial support to implement incentive programs across the country 
could require significant resources, and it is not clear how federal or 
state budgets would accommodate this need. This problem could be 
compounded by the fact that the financial incentives in question would 
diminish overall tax revenue that could be spent on environmental and 
public health programs. 
B. Program Implementation 
There are various logistical challenges associated with 
implementing the proposed legislation. There could be a disparity 
between the emissions reduction standards set by the federal 
government and the results of programs implemented at the local level. 
Even if a state successfully implements many local incentives in each 
of the required sectors, it may not achieve a prescribed level of 
emissions reduction. Therefore, federal goals should focus on the 
number and types of programs implemented within each state rather 
than a specific quantity of emissions reduction. This should be 
proportionate to the state’s population. A state like Montana, which 
has a little over one million residents, should not be required to 
implement the same number of programs or achieve the same level of 
emissions reduction as New York, which has a population of nearly 
twenty million.64 Just as incentives must be tailored to characteristics 
of local communities, federally-imposed standards should account for 
differences between states. 
Measuring and policing compliance is a challenge inherent in the 
existing structure of the Clean Air Act. Since states are delegated 
authority to administer national standards, they are responsible for 
tracking and reporting compliance with SIPs. In reality, state 
monitoring under the Clean Air Act is often imperfect, or even 
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inadequate. In the context of the proposed legislation, states would be 
expected to adopt a minimum number of programs across specific 
sectors, not enforce a specific numerical standard. Therefore, 
participation is compliance, and states are rewarded for participating 
via a basket of federal incentives. The federal government may 
implement federally-operated programs in states that choose not to 
administer their own programs, as in the Clean Air Act. This structure 
eliminates the need for complex monitoring and policing. It is much 
simpler to determine whether states have designed and implemented a 
local program than to measure adherence to air quality standards. 
Because an analysis of costs, benefits, and environmental impact 
should be conducted for each incentive program prior to adoption, it 
will not be necessary to measure specific emissions reductions in each 
state after implementation. 
Additionally, states may not reap the benefits of programs that do 
not reduce emissions locally. This is another reason why it is important 
for state compliance to be measured by program implementation rather 
than numerical benchmarks. States should be rewarded for 
incentivizing residents to subscribe to renewable energy ESCOs even 
if the energy source is in a different state. An incentive system based 
purely on reductions within a state’s borders ignores the national and 
sometimes global effect of shifting energy demand. Likewise, 
composting food scraps could reduce GHG emissions from the 
vehicles needed to transport waste to landfills in other states, as well 
as from the landfills themselves. A state that adopts policies that have 
positive impacts in other states should be rewarded as if the emissions 
took place in its own state. 
In the same vein, it would be unfair to allow a state that implemented 
few sustainability measures to reap the benefits of emissions reduction 
measures implemented by other states. For example, if Ohio residents 
receive their energy from solar farms in Arizona, Ohio should be 
rewarded for the emissions reductions even though the energy wasn’t 
generated there. This analysis becomes complicated if the same solar 
farm serves customers in multiple states, making it difficult to track 
which emissions reductions are attributable to which states. One way 
to address this problem is to calculate the annual GHG emissions from 
an individual that sources his or her energy from fossil fuels. If that 
individual transitions to renewable energy generated in a different 
state, the amount of emissions saved may be attributed to that 
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individual’s state, even if individuals in other states use the same 
source. This shifts the focus to emissions reduced by the individual 
rather than the source, allowing residents of Ohio to get “credit” for 
their emissions reductions even if the impact is felt in Arizona. 
Furthermore, it may be difficult to calculate the net benefits of 
proposed initiatives. For example, composting can reduce methane 
emissions from landfills, but compost piles also produce methane 
during decomposition. While composting saves space in landfills and 
has some carbon storage properties, it could come with unintended 
consequences. If the same trucks previously transported food waste 
and other garbage to the landfill together, separating organics for 
composting might require more trucks to take separated waste to 
different destinations, consuming gasoline and emitting GHGs in the 
process. Thus, a reduction of emissions in one realm may cause an 
increase in another. It is important to consider the indirect effects of 
such practices to ensure that government funds are not spent on 
programs that provide little net reduction in GHG emissions. In 
addition, initiatives like composting may have benefits unassociated 
with reducing GHG emissions. A growing national population, 
particularly in dense, northeastern localities, raises land use concerns 
that will become increasingly relevant as existing landfills reach 
maximum capacity. Urban waste management could become more 
difficult as the distance between residents and the nearest landfills 
increase. 
An additional challenge is that some states may opt to give up a 
small portion of federal funds rather than invest resources in designing 
and implementing incentive programs. Since the amount of federal 
funds withheld cannot be large enough to be coercive, states retain the 
choice of whether or not to participate. The Clean Air Act addressed 
this problem by issuing a federal implementation plan for states that 
failed to submit an approvable plan of their own. The federal 
government could take a similar approach here, although this would 
frustrate the goal of tailoring incentive programs to local 
characteristics. The federal implementation plan could include 
incentives that cut across geographic and demographic differences, 
such as tax credits or rebates for energy-efficient appliances and 
electric or hybrid vehicles. Since waste management and 
transportation alternatives are typically coordinated at the local level, 
2018] REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 143 
 
it would not be feasible to include such programming in a federal 
implementation plan. 
Finally, there is the possibility that incentive programs will fail to 
change behavior enough to meaningfully reduce GHG emissions. 
Even if a state successfully coordinates local incentives, there are 
barriers to widespread participation. First, extensive outreach will be 
necessary to educate the public on the available incentives. Because 
the proposed legislation aims to streamline various programs, a 
coordinated publicity effort could raise awareness of existing 
incentives in addition to new ones. It is harder to educate the general 
public about environmental laws than regulated entities, and this may 
be one reason why past legislation has focused on industrial rather than 
individual GHG emissions. Vandenbergh et al. have described design 
principles to assess energy efficiency programs for the household 
sector, including selecting high-impact actions, providing sufficient 
financial incentives, effective marketing, intervening at the point of 
decision-making, simplicity, and quality-assurance.65 These principles 
could be applied to assess and improve the effectiveness of incentives 
under the proposed legislation. 
In addition, financial incentives do not guarantee behavior change. 
If a person is not interested in composting or biking to work, there may 
be no financial incentive sufficient to shift their behavior, particularly 
if they have a comfortable lifestyle. In addition, consumers purchase 
cars and major household appliances infrequently. A person may be 
unwilling to invest in a new car or appliance if their existing one is 
functional, despite the financial incentives to do so. To address the 
problems of complacency and apathy, financial incentives must be 
meaningful enough for individuals to resist the strong pull of the status 
quo. In order for states to be willing to invest the necessary resources 
to offer compelling incentives, a cost-benefit analysis must 
demonstrate the long-term benefits of reducing GHG emissions and 
reduced state spending on resiliency and recovery, emergency 
response, health, and other costs associated with climate change. 
Despite these challenges, there is cause for optimism about the 
potential of behavior-shifting legislation. Recycling programs across 
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the country have successfully changed the way individuals view and 
dispose of certain types of waste. The results may not have been 
immediate, but today recycling is a social norm in the cities and states 
that have adopted such legislation.66 On the other hand, some argue 
that reducing waste by recycling and composting is expensive and does 
not yield worthwhile environmental benefits.67 This paper has outlined 
a legislative framework to incorporate existing and potential incentives 
that shift individual behaviors, but it has not evaluated the costs and 
benefits of particular programs. A quantitative analysis would be 
needed to ensure that the costs of selected incentive programs would 
not exceed the environmental benefits in order for such legislation to 
be feasible. Given the resources required to implement effective 
incentive programs, incentives should be selected based on their 
potential to maximize reductions of GHG emissions. 
Climate change is a problem that grows more urgent as time passes. 
Targeting emissions from the largest polluters is inadequate to achieve 
national GHG emissions reductions that will ensure a safe future on 
this planet for current and future generations. A coordinated effort 
between federal, state, and local governments is necessary to harness 
the power of individual actions within a comprehensive regulatory 
framework. Cooperative federalism, as implemented in the Clean Air 
Act, can provide a useful model in crafting these policies. 
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